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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(h) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of the 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Carolyn Fitzgerald (hereinafter "Carolyn") sought a 
divorce from Perry Fitzgerald (hereinafter "Perry"), by filing 
a Verified Complaint on September 16, 1981. The parties had 
extensive negotiations and in June 1982 entered into a Property 
Settlement and Child Custody Agreement (hereinafter "Property 
Settlement"). On August 4, 1982f Perry's counsel, Mr. Hansen, 
executed a Consent to Default and Waiver. A default divorce 
was granted on August 6, 1982. No appeal was filed. Before 
the Property Settlement was entered into, a Utah County case 
entitled Corbett & Gurr v. Fitzgerald, Case No. 50244, 
(hereinafter "Case No. 50244" or "Corbett-Gurr Judgment"), was 
decided by Judge Robert Bullock. This decision changed the 
terms of the Property Settlement. 
Perry filed an action entitled Perry G. Fitzgerald v. 
Keith L. Gurr, Case No. C86-551, on January 24, 1986. This 
case was consolidated with Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, D81-3721, 
on April 10, 1986. 
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On February 7f 1986, Perry filed a petition to amend 
the decree of divorce. Carolyn responded. The Commissioner/ 
Sandra Peuler, recommended the petition be denied. Perry 
objected. The matter was tried before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya on November 5, 1986. The trial court denied Perry's 
petition on January 14f 1987. Perry moved for a new trial. 
The motion for a new trial was denied on August 28, 1987. 
Perry filed this appeal on September 28f 1987. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Perry asserts that the trial court erred in not 
amending or modifying the decree of divorce: 
I. to reflect the interest of the parties; 
II. to distribute the Corbett-Gurr Judgment to 
Perry as opposed to allowing the parties to share 
equally; 
III. for not finding a compelling change of 
circumstance which would allow a modification of the 
decree from the stipulated Property Settlement; 
IV. and awarding attorney fees to Carolyn. 
Carolyn seeks affirmance of the trial court and 
attorney fees and costs against Perry and Mr. Hansen, jointly 
and severally for this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An action was commenced in Utah County entitled 
Corbett v, Fitzgerald, Civil No. 50224, wherein Fitzgerald's 
(hereinafter "Carolyn and Perry") counterclaimed against 
Corbett and Gurr for recision. Carolyn and Perry obtained 2140 
acres in Cedar Valley from Corbett and Gurr in exchange for an 
eightplex. The eightplex was sold by Corbett and Gurr to a 
third party and hence recision would not lie, so money damages 
was awarded to Carolyn and Perry against Corbett and Gurr 
(R.85). Initially, Carolyn and Perry were represented by 
Richard C. Howe and then later by Robert B. Hansen in Civil No. 
50224 (R.85). Civil No. 50224 was decided by the trial Court 
before the divorce action was heard. The property involved in 
Case No. 50224 was designated as "2140 Acres - purchased from 
Corbett and Gurr" in the Property Settlement and drafts 
(R.273). 
Carolyn filed an action against Perry to terminate the 
marital relationship. The action was commenced September 16, 
1981 (R.2). Carolyn, in the Verified Complaint, asserted that 
the parties had acquired numerous real property holdings, bank 
accounts, contract receivables, of which she was not totally 
familiar and that Perry should be required to disclose the same 
and divide them equally with her. (R.3). 
Perry admitted in his Answer that the parties had in 
fact acquired numerous real properties, bank accounts and 
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contracts receivables and that "the parties1 entire estate 
should be equally divided" (R.17) . Thereafter the parties 
through their respective attorneys, Mr. Rudd representing 
Carolyn and Mr. Hansen representing Perry, conducted numerous 
discussions for purposes of negotiating a settlement. (Rudd 
Depo. pp. 30-41) . 
There were a number of drafts of the Property 
Settlement prepared and considered by the parties (Exhibits 
5-P, 6-P, 7-P, 16-P, 18-P and 19-P, R.219-254). 
Prior to May lf 1982f at least three drafts of the 
proposed Property Settlement and Child Visitation Agreement 
were submitted to Mr. Hansen by Mr. Rudd (R.213). Initially, 
the parties, Carolyn and Perry, were discussing awarding the 
"2140 Acres - purchased from Corbett and Gurr" property to 
Perry (R.213). However, on May 4, 1982, Mr. Hansen called Mr. 
Rudd and told him that there was a ruling in the Utah County 
Case No. 50224 which was favorable to Carolyn and Perry (R.214 
and 228). 
In light of the Utah County Court's ruling on May 4, 
1982, Carolyn and her father felt that she should be awarded 
her share of the judgment (R.214) . On May 11, 1982, Mr. Rudd 
wrote a letter to Mr. Hansen in which Mr. Rudd requested of Mr. 
Hansen: 
The only question or problem I have at the 
present time, is dealing with the return of 
the apartment home and/or your money 
settlement with Corbett and Gurr. Because 
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the divorce is not finalized and a 
settlement signed, my client is i nterested 
in obtaining a portion of that real property 
or judgment (R.230). 
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response to a telephone call from Mr. Hansenf acknowledged the 
successful outcome of the appeal and Carolyn's desire to pay 
her share of the fees and to receive her share of the proceeds 
(R.305-306). 
Perry had not been current on child support almost 
from the beginning and a judgment for past due support and 
attorney's fees was entered against Perry on December 23, 1985 
(R.52-54) in the amount of approximately $23,000.00. 
Gurr purchased from Carolyn her interest in and to the 
Corbett-Gurr Judgment and the past due judgments of $23,000.00 
(R.264). The court allowed an offset of the $23,000 judgment 
and Gurr satisfied the remainder of Perry's interest in the 
Corbett-Gurr Judgment. (R.146-151). 
Perry asserted in his petition to modify and the 
concurrent action against Mr. Gurr that the Corbett-Gurr 
Judgment should be his sole property and that Carolyn had no 
interest therein. Or, in the alternative, that there was a 
material change of circumstances which would allow a 
modification to the decree and that as a result of his debts, 
he needed to be awarded the sole ownership of the Corbett-Gurr 
Judgment. 
The trial court, after a full hearing, adopted the 
Commissioner's recommendation and held that there was no change 
of circumstance which would allow a modification to the Decree 
of Divorce (R.94-95) and that the interest of the parties was 
clear from the documentation. 
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II 
The Bullock Judgment was awarded to Perry G. 
Fitzgerald and Carolyn S. Fitzgerald. Mr. Hansen represented 
both parties in Case No. 50244. The Corbett-Gurr Judgment was 
removed from the Property Settlement on purpose so that both 
parties would share equally in the judgment. 
Ill 
Perry failed to show any change of circumstance which 
would allow the trial court to modify or amend the Decree of 
Divorce. Where the parties have stipulated to the Property 
Settlement, which Property Settlement was adopted by the courtf 
the Appellant must show "compelling reasons" to modify the 
same. See Foulger v. Foulgery 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). 
The only evidence of a change of circumstance was the 
testimony of Perry. The testimony of Perry was in direct 
conflict with the written documentation between the parties, 
the written Property Settlement, the letters from Mr. Hansen to 
Mr. Rudd, the testimony of Carolyn and Mr. Rudd. 
IV 
The awarding of attorney fees and costs was 
appropriate under the evidence submitted to the court and the 
stipulation of the parties at trial. The evidence reflects the 
need for Carolyn and the reasonableness of the fees. See 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1988) . 
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V 
Attorney fees and sanctions should be awarded jointly 
and severally against Perry, and counsel for Appellant, 
inasmuch as this Appeal is violative of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure, § 
30-3-3 and § 30-3-5 and case law. See O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) and Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
It is the trial court's prerogative to hear and weigh 
the evidence and to make findings of fact. These findings of 
fact will not be upset when supported by substantiated 
evidence in the record. Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 
1987), Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986), Mineer 
v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
The Issues as framed by Appellant are: 
1) Did the trial court err in not amending 
Exhibit "A" to the Property Settlement? 
2) Did the trial court err in determining the 
interest of the parties as to the Corbett-Gurr 
lawsuit? 
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3) Was there a change of circumstances? 
4) Did the lower court err in awarding attorney's 
fees? 
The findings of fact of the lower court are all substantiated 
by ample evidence in the record and the lower court's ruling 
should be affirmed and attorney's fees and costs awarded to 
Carolyn under both Rule 11 and § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
The issues raised by the Appellant will be discussed 
in their respective order. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT 
AMENDING THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
Perry asserted that the Corbett-Gurr property was to 
be awarded to him solely. However, the evidence was to the 
contrary. It is obvious that substantial negotiations were 
carried on between the parties before the Property Settlement 
was finalized. Before the final Property Settlement, Case 
No. 50224 was decided by Judge Bullock. The Bullock decision 
was discussed by Mr. Hansen and Mr. Rudd. Exhibit "A" to the 
Property Settlement was changed as a direct result of the 
discussions following Judge Bullock's decision. The parties 
executed the Property Settlement in June 1982 after the 
decision by Judge Bullock in 50224 and after the discussions 
between Mr. Hansen and Mr. Rudd. 
10 
Mr. Hansen had first hand actual knowledge of the 
extensive negotiations between the parties. He personally 
telephoned Mr. Rudd, gave a copy of the Bullock decision to Mr. 
Ruddf received letters from Mr. Rudd all concerning the very 
change in removing the "2140 Acres - Corbett and Gurr" property 
from Exhibit "A" to the Property Settlement. Mr. Hansen 
questioned Carolyn under oath, wherein Carolyn testified at 
page 44 of her deposition as follows: 
Q You say "it was withdrawn." (The 
Corbett and Gurr property.) Explain what 
you mean by that. 
A That before the divorce became final, I 
believe a judgment had been made and we 
withdrew that from Exhibit "A" in order to 
get my half of whatever came out of it. 
Q You say "you withdrew," what do you mean 
by that? 
A It was on Exhibit "A" on an earlier 
draft, but the judgment came down on it, or 
however, and so we withdrew it. 
Q Did Mr. Perry Fitzgerald agree to that? 
A Yes. 
Annexed in the Appendix to this Brief are copies of 
Exhibit "A" to the Property Settlement draft no. 3, the working 
copy which Mr. Rudd testified he changed after consultation 
with Mr. Hansen, and the Exhibit "A" to the executed final 
Property Settlement. These documents disclose the changes and 
how the changes came about as a direct result of the ruling of 
Judge Bullock. 
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Perry's counsel cites the testimony of Carolyn as 
dispositive that Carolyn did not know of her interest in the 
Corbett-Gurr Judgment. (See pages 8 and 9 of Appellant's 
Brief). However/ even a casual review of that testimony 
reveals that she did know of her interest and that she intended 
to benefit from that interest. At page 25 of Carolyn's 
testimony/ she testified: 
The Witness: Mr. Benneson was explaining/ I 
suppose, Perry's position in that at the 
time of the divorce that the Corbett and 
Gurr property was on Exhibit "A". And he 
showed me a rough draft that he had made 
himself, Mr. Benneson/ showing that it was 
on there. 
And at that timef I said to himf "I would 
like it in writing/ the final copyf showing 
that it's still there." 
And he said at that time that "Perry was 
going tof or had gone down to the City and 
County Building to get a copy of the Divorce 
Decree to see if it was there." 
And I explained my position as far as — as 
far as the phone call from my father and his 
attorney and that I would need more proof 
for what actually happened with that piece 
of property before I could make a decision. 
Carolyn's "position" was that she owned one-half 
interest in the judgment. This was consistent with the 
extensive negotiations after Judge Bullock's ruling of May 4f 
1982. 
On May 4f 1982 and May 6, 1982 Mr. Hansen telephone 
Mr. Rudd and advised him of the ruling by Judge Bullock. On 
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May 13, 1982, Mr. Hansen sent to Mr. Rudd a copy of the 
pertinent part of Judge Bullock's ruling (R.232-235) . On May 
11, 1982 Mr. Rudd advised Mr. Hansen that Carolyn wanted her 
share of the Corbett-Gurr Judgment by the following language: 
Because the divorce is not finalized and a 
Settlement signed, my client (Carolyn) is 
interested in obtaining a portion of that 
real property or judgment (R.230). 
On June 1, 1982, there was a letter from Mr. Hansen to Mr. Rudd 
agreeing to the changed Property Settlement which eliminated 
the "2140 Acres - Corbett and Gurr" from properties to be 
awarded solely to Perry. 
Finally, on June 5, 1982, Perry executed before a 
notary, the Property Settlement (R.21-27). On August 4, 1982, 
Mr. Hansen executed the Consent to a Default Judgment and 
Waiver, which specifically recited the Property Settlement 
of June 1982 (R.29). 
Carolyn testified at pages 69 through 74: 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) . . . How many different 
drafts were there as you recall for the 
Property Settlement that led up to the 
Divorce Decree? 
A Probably about four. 
• * * 
Q . . . When was the draft that was 
finally executed prior the divorce, what 
conferences were there, or maybe there was 
just one, that led up to the final draft, 
okay? 
A All right. I believe you phoned my 
attorney, Lee Rudd, in May and informed him 
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of the decision of Judge Bullock. And I 
believe he wrote to you after that 
conversation after he had talked to me. And 
we decided that whereas a decision has been 
made that I would like my share of that 
judgment. 
Q Do you have a copy of that letter? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have it here? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) Is this document that's 
been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 3 the 
letter that you just referred to? 
A Yes. 
Q Pursuant to that letter, were documents 
executed to carry out his suggestion there? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have a copy of those? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) I'm showing you what 
has been marked for identification as 
Deposition Exhibit No. 4. Would you look at 
that and tell us if that's the document you 
referred to? 
A Yes, it is. 
Exhibit 3 to the deposition is Mr. Rudd's letter to Mr. Hansen 
dated May 11, 1982 wherein Mr. Rudd wants to have Carolyn share 
in the Corbett-Gurr Judgment. Exhibit 4 to the deposition is 
the final Property Settlement wherein the "2140 Acres" is 
14 
removed from Exhibit "A" to the Property Settlement as a result 
of the negotiations. 
Carolyn further testified of discussions of her 
interest at page 26 of her testimony as follows: 
Mr. Hansen: I want to know who she talked 
with about that subject. (Carolyn having an 
interest in the Corbett-Gurr Judgment.) 
* * * 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) At any time before today 
and other than conversations with your 
attorney which you've invoked the privilege 
on, tell us who else you had any discussion 
with on that subject. 
A My father's attorney, Allen Swan, with 
my attorney, Lee Rudd, and I did discuss it 
some with my father. Are you asking just 
whoever I talked to? 
Q Whoever you talked with on that subject. 
A My Husband, Don. 
Q Okay. 
A Of course, Mr. Benneson and Perry. 
Q Mr. Benneson and who? 
A Perry. 
Q Okay. 
A That's all that I can remember. 
That testimony is consistent with the extensive negotiations 
and exchanges between May 4th and August 4, 1982. Mr. Sill, 
Carolyn's father, called Mr. Rudd on May 6, 1982 and insisted 
that Carolyn obtain a share of the Corbett-Gurr Judgment 
(R.214-229). 
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Mr. Rudd testified at pages 36-37 of his deposition as 
follows: 
Q (By Mr. Hansen to Mr. Rudd) Now, was it 
intended in the Divorce Decree that that 
would be a final distribution of all the 
assets, or were there some that were being 
held in abeyance for a subsequent 
distribution? 
A You mean in the total — the Decree 
itself? 
Q Yes. 
A The final Decree? I would — as I 
recollect — and we went back and forth with 
numerous things — but I would assume that 
we structured it so that certain assets went 
out of their ownership prior to the Decree, 
specifically to the trust. And there may 
have been others. 
Then the Decree and the Property Settlement 
talked about those items that are 
specifically enumerated therein. And then 
anything that was not discussed and not 
transferred would have remained in their 
joint ownership. 
Q Well, was it your intent to leave 
certain property in joint ownership? 
A If it was not discussed and handled. 
Q Well, that might be a legal effect. But 
I'm asking you, was it intended to be that 
wax? 
A I believe so. I believe that — 
Q What was the purpose for that? 
A I suppose because there were certain 
things that were not known what the 
resolution was or where it was going and no 
agreement to be made as to really what to do 
with those. 
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Q What were those unknowns? 
A At this time and without this reference, 
I really don't know. Apparently, as I 
recall now, the Corbett and Gurr property 
and lawsuit. There may have been others 
that I haven't taken the time to review back 
through. I think there were some other 
properties out in Cedar Valley, too. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
It was clearly the intent of Carolynf Mr. Sill (her father) , 
and Mr. Rudd to obtain an interest in the Corbett-Gurr 
Judgment. Mr. Hansen and Perry both executed documents which 
granted to both parties an equal interest in the Corbett-Gurr 
Judgment. That result is in accord with the pleadings in the 
case. The trial court did not err in holding that the interest 
of the parties is manifest by the written agreements executed 
by both parties and adopted by the court in granting the 
divorce. 
Mr. Hansen acknowledged all of the interchanges 
between himself and Mr. Rudd about the Corbett-Gurr Judgment 
(R.136 Pages 60-68) . Mr. Hansen admitted that he read every 
draft of the Property Settlement. At page 65 of the transcript 
(R.136), Mr. Hansen testified: 
Q And was this entered knowingly — had 
you read the stipulation and settlement 
agreement dated the 8th day of Junef 1982? 
A I read all the drafts that were sent to 
me. 
Carolyn testified at the November 5th hearing at pages 72 and 
73 of the transcript (R.136), as follows: 
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Q Now, what changed your mind about that? 
A Mr. Hansen called, said that Judge 
Bullock had decided in Perry's favor and 
then at that time it was still — had not 
been decided that it would go all to Perry, 
that it was also — some of it was to come 
to me. 
Q And then did you have further 
discussions and negotiations with your 
husband at that time either through counsel 
or direct about whether or not he would be 
awarded the Corbett-Gurr property only? 
A After May? 
• * • 
Q Was there some discussions that would 
not go solely to Mr. Fitzgerald? 
A Yes, there was. 
Q And as a result of that, did you read 
Exhibit 18 before you signed it? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you understand that Exhibit 18 
excluded the Corbett-Gurr property? 
A Yes. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
TO ALLOW A MODIFICATION 
The trial court was guided by the law as enunciated in 
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981), wherein our 
Supreme Court declared at page 414 that the level of change of 
circumstances required to modify a decree is: 
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Where a disposition of real property is in 
question, however, courts should properly be 
more reluctant to grant a modification. In 
the interest of securing stability in 
titles, modifications in a decree of divorce 
making disposition of real property are to 
be granted only upon a showing of compelling 
reasons arising from a substantial and 
material change in circumstances. 
The above holds true a fortiori where the 
property disposition is the product of an 
agreement and stipulation between the 
parties, and sanctioned by the trial court. 
Such a provision is the product of an 
agreement bargained for by the parties. As 
such, a trial court should subsequently 
modify such a provision only with great 
reluctance, and based upon compelling 
reasons. (Citations omitted.) 
The parties, with the help of counsel, negotiated at 
length to arrive at the Property Settlement. The trial court 
properly found no compelling reason to alter that stipulated 
contract between the parties. The follow up letters of Mr. 
Hansen to Mr. Rudd is further evidence of the interest of the 
parties. Not one bit of evidence exists in the record to 
support Perry's contention other than his own self serving 
testimony which is contrary to his own written agreement. 
The trial court specifically concluded at page 91 of 
the record: 
1. That where the parties have stipulated 
by agreement to the property disposition and 
said property distribution is a product of 
an agreement and approved by the court and 
was entered into after substantial and 
lengthy negotiations without duress or undue 
influence that the property distribution 
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should not be set aside or modified without 
compelling reasons. See Foulger v. Foulger, 
626 P.2d 412 (1981) . 
* * * 
3. No such material or substantial change 
of circumstances has been proven to the 
court inasmuch as all parties were well 
aware of and substantial negotiations were 
entered into and about the Corbett-Gurr 
properties and judgment. 
There simply is no change of circumstance other than 
the affirmance on appeal of the Corbett-Gurr Judgment. It 
certainly would be contemplated by all parties the possibility 
of the judgment being affirmed. As the court in Foulgery 
supra, declared at 414: 
Matters such as payments on the home, and 
maintenance and upkeep thereof, certainly 
must have been within plaintiff's 
contemplation at the time she agreed to the 
disposition set forth in the original 
divorce decree. 
Equally, the parties surely must have contemplated that the 
Corbett-Gurr Judgment could be affirmed. What other possible 
change is there? The record is devoid of any change other than 
the manifestation of Perry's greed and avarice by asserting 
sole ownership of the judgment when the judgment was awarded 
jointly to the parties. 
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POINT IV 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE 
AWARDED FOR THIS APPEAL 
Attorney fees are awardable under both statutory 
provisions and case law to a prevailing party, i.e.; § 30-3-4 
and § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. See Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah 1988) and Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 
417 (Utah 1986) . The parties stipulated at the end of the 
trial that the prevailing party would submit by affidavit the 
evidence of the amount of attorney's fees. See Findings of 
Fact No. 36 (R.90) . An affidavit appears in the record at 
pages 78-83. There is evidence of the reasonableness thereof 
uncontroverted by Appellant. 
The record is replete of the need for Carolyn to 
receive assistance in these proceedings. Carolyn has had 
difficulty in collecting even child support in the past, has 
been unemployed and has a large family. Mr. Rudd and Carolyn 
testified of the difficulty of collecting the judgment against 
Perry, and the past due condition of her house payments. 
Carolyn had no means with which to defend this action brought 
by Perry. She was the prevailing party and the trial court 
appropriately awarded fees and costs. 
On appeal, the rule of law for attorney's fees for a 
prevailing party is still found in the statutory and case 
authority heretofore cited. However, in addition, there is 
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authority for attorney fees to be awarded against Perry and Mr. 
Hansen under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
33(e) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and the cases 
of O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987), Barber v. 
The Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1988), Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988), and Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988) . 
Under the guidelines of Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership, supra, this court gave direction to Mr. Hansen to 
make a decision to appeal "after careful consideration by 
counsel and client." 
Mr. Hansen had actual first hand knowledge of the 
extensive negotiations between the parties. He personally 
wrote letters, gave a copy of the Bullock decision to Mr. Rudd, 
received letters from Mr. Rudd all concerning the very change 
in removing the "2140 Acres - Corbett and Gurr" property from 
Exhibit "A" to the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Hansen had actual 
knowledge of Carolyn's testimony and the testimony of Mr. Swan 
and Mr. Rudd. 
Mr. Hansen, if he doesn't know, should have known of 
the scope of review before this court. The trial court's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed if there is sufficient 
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evidence in the record to substantiate the findings. Clearly 
the evidence in the record substantiates the trial court's 
findings. In fact, the only evidence to support the claims of 
Perry's alleged change in circumstance is the unsupportable 
testimony of Perry, which testimony is in direct conflict with 
the pleadings, the negotiations, the written Property 
Settlement and the testimony of Carolyn and Mr. Rudd. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed and the 
matter remanded for an award of attorney's fees and costs to be 
assessed jointly and severally against Appellant and 
Appellant's counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the / 2- day of February 
1989. 
JARPOTT-LINEBAUGH, BROWN A DUNN 
J a ^ Q . Bj 
>rneys fo*r Respondent 
'Carolyn F i t z g e r a l d 
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APPENDIX 
E X H I B I T *A' 
2140 acres - purchased from Corbett & Gurr or 
Leland Fitzgerald. 
1840 acres - purchased from Calvin Hall. 
320 acres - purchased from Hutchings. 
80 acres - purchased from Murdock. 
1.75 acres - T3S R1E, Section 5 - Sandy. 
180 acres - purchased from Davis and others. 
415 Post Street, Salt Lake City. 
4143 Parkview Drive, Salt Lake City. 
36 Holden Street, Midvale. 
156 West Lennox Street, Midvale. 
119 3rd Avenue, Midvale. 
QQGZZS 
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E X H I B I T 'A' 
f £-/}_ 1340 acres - purchased from Calvin Hall. 
\/&j> 320 acres - purchased from Hutchings. 
ZjEXC^- 80 acres - purchased from Murdock. 
T I C pi TJ^ A:I~, [L'i ^  ^Cand;^ 
_5^# 180 acres - purchased from Davis and others. 
J&.& 415 Post Street, Salt Lake City. 
-a—:*-,—u-i 
-^.v-fr—'-*.**^--?~>11 Z.r.\c CirfcV: 
^ - ^ 36 Holden S t r e e t , Midvale. 
\J?'£P 156 West Lennox S t r e e t , Midvale. 
^\jjr 119 3rd Avenue, Midvale. 
- 7 -
27 
r* QOO*:< 
E X H I B I T 'A' 
1840 acres - purchased from Calvin Hall, 
320 acres - purchased from Hutchings. 
80 acres - purchased from Murdock. 
180 acres - purchased from Davis and others 
415 Post Street, Salt Lake City. 
36 Holden Street, Midvale. 
156 West Lennox Street, Midvale. 
119 3rd Avenue, Midvale. 
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